CVE-2026-111497 is a buffer overflow in Google’s Brotli decoder (1.0.3 to 1.2.0) that is compiled into Node.js, Bun, Envoy, Python Brotli wheels, .NET and the browsers. A crafted Content-Encoding: br body reaches it with no login. The upstream fix is tiny; finding every bundled copy is the work. This post ships six Fleet queries with version logic that does not trust SQLite string comparison, a policy pattern, and what the queries found on a real fleet (hint: Pillow bundles libbrotli 1.2.0).
Eight eMudhra intermediate CA keys were generated as tiny, guessable numbers, so anyone can forge a trusted certificate for any website. Browsers and operating systems blocked them within three days. Everything that keeps its own copy of the trusted roots did not: Linux CA bundles, macOS /etc/ssl/cert.pem, Node.js, Python certifi, and the CA bundle Fleet’s own agent uses to reach the Fleet server. This brief explains the blast radius in plain words and ships three Fleet queries and three Fleet scripts (macOS, Windows, Linux) that find and fix the exposure, tested on real hosts and containers.
ClickFix is the most active cross-platform initial-access technique of 2026 — fake CAPTCHAs and support prompts that silently copy a malicious command to the clipboard, instruct the user to paste it into the Windows Run dialog or macOS Terminal, and deliver infostealers (Lumma, AMOS), remote-access tools (NetSupport RAT), and AppleScript keychain stealers. No code-execution vulnerability is exploited — the victim is the delivery mechanism. This brief walks the five-stage attack flow, lists atomic indicators, and ships a Fleet/osquery detection pack with every query validated against the current Fleet table schema.
Trend Micro disclosed SHADOW-EARTH-053 on 30 April 2026 — a China-aligned cyberespionage campaign exploiting ProxyLogon against unpatched Microsoft Exchange and IIS to deploy GODZILLA web shells and ShadowPad across South, East, and Southeast Asia plus one NATO target. This brief documents the campaign through Lockheed’s seven kill-chain stages with a Diamond Model rendered for each stage, consolidates the atomic indicators, and ships a vetted Fleet/osquery detection pack. Every query in the pack has been audited against fleetdm.com/tables before publication — schema bugs in the publicly circulating versions are called out and corrected inline.
